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Recent Decisions under the
Investment Canada Act:
Is Canada Changing its Stance on
Foreign Direct Investment?
Simone Collins
Abstract: With the globalization of the world’s economy, countries have relied
heavily on foreign direct investment within their borders to spur domestic
economic growth and compete in the global marketplace. Canada, historically
a leading destination for foreign investors, has seen its share of global foreign
direct investment decline steadily over the past several decades. Most recently,
Canada has made waves in the global community by taking positive actions to
interfere with foreign acquisitions of Canadian entities, despite the Canadian
government’s declarations to global competitors advocating free market
principles and denouncing protectionist policies. This article discusses
Canada’s procedures governing foreign direct investment within its borders and
examines the Canadian government’s recent foreign direct investment decisions
and their potential negative implications on Canada’s position in the global
marketplace. Given the benefits of foreign direct investment, this article argues
that Canada needs to improve transparency regarding its decisions on foreign
direct investment to alleviate global concerns of increasing government
interference with foreign investors seeking to enter the Canadian economy.
Additionally, the article argues that Canada should establish clearer metrics for
its review of foreign direct investment to ensure that Canada maintains
credibility in the global community as a leading destination for foreign
investment opportunities.
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INTRODUCTION
The growth in the world’s economy over the past twenty years has, in
large part, resulted from the rapid increase in, and globalization of, foreign
direct investment (FDI)1. Recognizing the benefits of FDI, many nations
have taken an active role in liberalizing their trade and investment policies
to make their investment landscapes more attractive to foreign enterprises.
Canada followed suit and relaxed its barriers on foreign investment with the
passage of the Investment Canada Act (ICA) in 1985. Historically, Canada
has been a leading destination for FDI. Recent trends in FDI, however,
raise concerns that Canada might be losing ground in the global FDI race.
While Canada still maintains a strong foothold on FDI, downward trends in
FDI growth and controversy over Canada’s recent applications of the ICA
indicate Canada should reevaluate its foreign investment law to ensure it is
in a position to better compete with other nations and continue to take
advantage of the global FDI market that is set to expand further in the near
future.
Although Canada has largely lived up to its self-described status as a
“wide open foreign direct investment opportunity,”2 the truth of this
statement has come under scrutiny with Canada’s recent decisions to use
the ICA to block foreign acquisitions of Canadian companies and to
undertake enforcement proceedings against a particular foreign investor.
Most recently, Canada stepped in to prevent the Anglo-Australian mining
company BHP Billiton Ltd. from acquiring the Canadian Potash
Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc.3
While the full impact of Canada’s recent decisions on FDI is still to be
1
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can be defined as the “total value of equity, long-term
debt and short-term debt held by foreign enterprises” within a country’s borders. MICHAEL
HOLDEN, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, OVERVIEW OF CANADIAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT 1 (2008)
(Can.), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/ prb0833e.pdf. Stated differently, FDI “reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a
resident entity in one economy (‘direct investor’) in an entity in an economy other than that
of the investor (‘direct investment enterprise’).” ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
OECD BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 7 (3d ed. 1996), available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 10/16/2090148.pdf.
2
Nirmala Menon, Canada’s Flaherty: We’re Wide Open to Foreign Investment, WALL
ST. J. BLOG (Nov. 11, 2010, 8:38 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2010/11/11
/canadas-flaherty-were-wide-open-to-foreign-investment/ (quoting Canadian Minister of
Finance Jim Flaherty).
3
See infra Part III.
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determined, Canada must make necessary changes to its investment review
process to prevent any potential negative effects on foreign investment in
Canada and to protect Canada’s ability to invest abroad. In its review of
Canada’s foreign investment laws, the Canadian federal government must
reevaluate its foreign investment review process under the ICA in order to
better align it with Canada’s stated policy objectives. Specifically, Canada
must provide clearer, more objective metrics for its review of FDI to
prevent political motivations and personal agendas from influencing
government decisions. By recognizing the significance of its recent
decisions and answering concerns with appropriate policy amendments,
Canada can ensure it continues to reap the benefits of FDI.
Part I of this Comment discusses the evolution of Canada’s policy on
FDI and the current review process under the ICA. Part II provides
research on the merits of FDI and empirical data on global FDI trends in
relation to FDI trends in Canada. Part III discusses the Canadian
government’s recent history-making applications of the ICA that potentially
signify a change of course in the government’s attitude toward foreign
investment. Lastly, Part IV argues that, in light of the positive influence of
FDI and Canada’s desire to attract foreign investors, the Canadian
government should bring more transparency to the review process under the
ICA to alleviate global concerns about the potential for increased
government interference with foreign takeovers of Canadian companies.
I.
THE EVOLUTION OF CANADA’S POLICY ON FDI
Government policies have significant influence on FDI as they can
serve to make a country either more or less attractive to foreign investors.4
Canada’s attitude and policies on FDI have vacillated over the last forty
years with the country’s changes in political and public opinion, swaying
from laissez-faire to protectionist and then back again.5 Prior to the 1970s,
Canada’s hands-off approach to FDI created a favorable environment for
foreigners to invest in the country free of any serious obstacles.6 This
liberal climate took a drastic change, however, when a 1972 publication by
then-Canadian Consumer and Corporate Affairs Minister Herb Gray on the
level of FDI in Canada, known as the “Gray Report,” confirmed a growing
public belief that foreign investment had expanded to potentially harmful
levels.7 According to the report, the ownership landscape for Canadian
companies was heavily foreign controlled with foreign ownership at 60% of
4

Steven Globerman & Daniel M. Shapiro, The Impact of Government Policies on
Foreign Direct Investment: The Canadian Experience, 30 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 513, 515
(1999).
5
Chris Lalonde, Dubai or Not Dubai?: A Review of Foreign Investment and Acquisition
Laws in the U.S. and Canada, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1475, 1484 (2008).
6
Id.
7
See GOV’T OF CANADA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA (1972).
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manufacturing companies, 76% of the energy sector, and 90% in certain
other industries.8 The Gray Report indicated foreign control had become so
rampant that any potential benefits from FDI were overshadowed by the
serious threat posed to Canada’s economic goals.9
To counteract these fears, the government implemented the Foreign
Investment Review Act (FIRA) in 1974, which created an agency tasked
with review of “all direct and indirect acquisitions of control of Canadian
businesses and the establishment of all new businesses by foreigners.”10
The FIRA review process required all foreign investors seeking to acquire
control of Canadian businesses to submit applications promising significant
undertakings to ensure their requested investment would bring considerable
benefits to Canada.11 Although FIRA’s stated mission was “not to
discourage FDI but to ensure significant benefits to Canadians,”12 the added
obstacles and burdens the FIRA review process placed on FDI and foreign
investors were questioned in the 1980s when Canada began to feel the
negative effects of a significant downturn in FDI.13 In the face of a
recession in the early 1980s and mounting criticism of the FIRA review
process from the international community, along with “a better
understanding, in all sectors of Canadian society, of the costs of a policy
perceived by foreigners as being antagonistic to foreign capital,” the
government realized “economic nationalism” should no longer drive its
attitude and policy on FDI.14
Following the election of a new Conservative Party, the government
passed the Investment Canada Act (ICA) in 1985, which repealed FIRA and
implemented a more moderate review process consistent with the political
climate shift towards increased foreign investments.15 The stated mission
of the ICA was a departure from that of FIRA:

8

Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 5–8 (summarizing major economic and social costs associated with foreign
investment in Canada).
10
Jean Raby, The Investment Provisions of the Canada–United States Free Trade
Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 394, 396 (1990).
11
Globerman & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 516. During the period between 1974 and
1984, more than 90% of applications reviewed by the Agency were approved, presumably
on a finding of a “significant benefit” to Canada. Raby, supra note 10, at n. 6. While this
figure indicates the review process was relatively mild, the Agency’s roughly 7% rejection
rate is high compared to Australia’s 2.7% rejection rate over the same time frame. In
addition, the 7% rejection rate does not reflect the possible deterrent effect FIRA had on
foreign investors who were discouraged from putting investment proposals up for review,
although some argue against the existence of any deterrent effect. Globerman & Shapiro,
supra note 4, at 516.
12
Globerman & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 516.
13
Lalonde, supra note 5, at 1485.
14
Raby, supra note 10, at 396.
15
Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28 (1st Supp.) (Can.).
9
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Recognizing that increased capital and technology benefits Canada,
and recognizing the importance of protecting national security, the
purposes of this Act are to provide for the review of significant
investments in Canada by non-Canadians in a manner that
encourages investment, economic growth and employment
opportunities in Canada and to provide for the review of investments
in Canada by non-Canadians that could be injurious to national
security. 16

Emphasizing that the new Act was an encouragement of FDI, thenPrime Minister Brian Mulroney declared, “Canada is open for business
again.”17
A. The Investment Canada Act
Since its passage in 1985, the ICA has been the body of law governing
the review of foreign investment in Canada. Although, like FIRA, the ICA
requires non-Canadians to obtain government approval before undertaking
any direct or indirect investment in Canada, the ICA procedures outline a
new, more streamlined scope of review.18 First, under the ICA, not all
foreign investments will come under review. Rather, review of a direct or
indirect investment or creation of a business by a non-Canadian19 will only
be triggered when certain thresholds are met. The ICA requires government
review of an investment to acquire control of a Canadian business in the
following cases: (1) direct acquisition20 of control of a Canadian business
with more than C$5 million (approximately US$4.9 million) in assets;21 (2)
indirect acquisition22 of control of a Canadian business with more than
C$50 million (approximately US$49 million) in assets;23 and (3) in the case
of a World Trade Organization (WTO) investor,24 direct acquisition of
16

Id. § 2.
James M. Spence, Current Approaches to Foreign Investment Review in Canada, 31
MCGILL L.J. 508, 508 (1985–1986).
18
Raby, supra note 10, at 397.
19
Investment Canada Act, § 11.
20
A “direct acquisition” refers to the acquisition of voting shares, voting interest, or all or
substantially all of the assets of a corporation incorporated in and carrying on business in
Canada. Id. at § 28(1)–(d).
21
Id. §§ 14(1)(a)–(b), 14(3), 28(1)(a)–(d).
22
“An indirect acquisition is a transaction involving the acquisition of the shares of a
company incorporated outside of Canada, which owns a subsidiaries in Canada.” Investment
Canada
Act—Help
with Forms,
INDUSTRY CANADA (June
18,
2010),
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk00055.html#indirect2.
23
Investment Canada Act, §§ 14(1)(d), 14(4), 28(1)(d)(ii).
24
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an organization consisting of 153 member
countries that seeks to liberalize trade and establish rules of trade between nations.
Understanding the WTO: What is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Sept. 30,
2011). A “WTO investor” refers to an individual who is a WTO member, a government of a
17
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control of a Canadian business with more than C$312 million
(approximately US$305 million) in assets.25
Acquisitions by WTO investors, whether direct or indirect, may come
under government review at the C$5 million (approximately US$4.9
million) and C$50 million (approximately $US49 million) thresholds26 if
the proposed acquisition relates to “Canada’s cultural heritage or national
identity.”27 The ICA identifies a reviewable “cultural business” transaction
as one involving the publication, distribution, and sale of books, magazines,
periodicals, newspapers, film, or music.28
In order for an investment to be approved under the ICA, the
government must be “satisfied that the investment is likely to be of net
benefit to Canada.”29 This open-ended standard is qualified by the
following list of factors that the government will take into account when
determining the existence of a “net benefit”:
the effect of the investment on the level and nature of economic
activity in Canada;
the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the
[business or industry at issue];
the effect of the investment on productivity, industrial efficiency,
technological development, product innovation and product variety
in Canada;
the effect of the investment on competition within any industry or
industries in Canada;
the compatibility of the investment with national industrial,
economic, and cultural policies [of Canada or any province therein];
WTO member, or a WTOinvestor-controlled entity. Investment Canada Act, § 14.1(6).
25
Investment Canada Act, § 14.1(1)(a), (2)–(3); Tony Clement, Investment Canada Act,
145 CANADA GAZETTE, Feb, 12, 2011, at 238. Section 14.1(2) of the ICA provides that the
threshold for WTO investors shall be determined by the Minister in January of each year
based on the nominal GDP at market prices for the current and previous year, and, pursuant
to section 14.1(3) of the ICA, that threshold is published in the Canada Gazette. The
threshold was C$299 million (approximately US$292 million) for 2010 and C$312 million
(approximately US$305 million) for 2009. Investment Canada Act—Thresholds, INDUSTRY
CANADA (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/h_ lk00050.html. The
current WTO threshold is based on book value of assets, but amendments to the ICA that are
not yet in force propose to increase the review threshold to C$600 million (approximately
US$587 million) in “enterprise value,” increasing to C$1 billion (approximately US$987
million) over the next four years. Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28, 448(1) (1st
Supp.) (Can.).
26
Investment Canada Act—Thresholds, supra note 25.
27
Investment Canada Act, § 15(a).
28
Id. § 14.1(6)(a)–(e).
29
Id. § 16(1).
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and
the contribution of the investment to Canada’s ability to compete in
world markets.30

In weighing these factors, the government is not bound by any set
formula and can consider a multitude of factors tailored to the specific
situation, giving the government broad discretion in its review process.31 A
literal reading of the factors suggests that the review process involves a
significant government undertaking requiring time-consuming, complex
economic studies. However, in practice, the ICA review process is not
nearly as meticulous and exacting as it sounds.32
Those investments that do not get through the review process
relatively unimpeded will usually end up in negotiations, where the
government will insist the applicant guarantee certain undertakings in order
to ensure a “net benefit” is achieved.33 To persuade the government, “the
applicant may submit undertakings with respect to such matters as levels of
employment, Canadian participation, research and development, and
investment so as to boost his request” for government approval.34
Consistent with the ICA’s stated purpose of encouraging foreign
investment, the government has historically preferred to use the ICA review
process as a means of “obtain[ing] concessions from potential foreign
investors through side agreements” rather than as a means of preventing
acquisitions.35
The review process under the ICA has largely lived up to former Prime
Minister Mulroney’s 1984 declaration that “Canada is open for business.”
For the first twenty-three years since the enactment of the ICA, Canada did
not reject any investment application under the ICA, with the exception of
certain isolated transactions involving sensitive cultural industries.36 The
refusal to approve an investment proved so rare that the ICA was described
as a “paper tiger,”37 and its review process analogized to “a ‘Welcome to

30

Id. § 20(a)–(f).
Raby, supra note 10, at 399.
32
See BUSINESS LAWS OF CANADA § 14:16 (Miller Thomson LLP ed., 2009) (discussing
how ICA review of foreign investment proposals is based on “a very open-ended and
subjective standard,” where approval is obtained by negotiation with government officials
over the amount of undertakings the foreign investor agrees to carry out).
33
Id.
34
Raby, supra note 10, at 399.
35
Lalonde, supra note 5, at 1488.
36
Howie Wong & Robert Dechert, Canadian Foreign Takeover Review, BUS. L. TODAY,
Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 22.
37
Kevin Ackhurst & Paul Beaudry, Canada: The Investment Canada Act: Paper Tiger
No More, MONDAQ (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.mondaq.com/canada/article.asp?articleid
=88800.
31
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Canada’ wave from the sleepy Canadian border guard.”38 However, such
descriptions of the ICA are no longer accurate in light of Canada’s recent
decisions under the ICA to block foreign takeovers of Canadian companies
for the first time in the legislation’s history.39
II. EMPIRICAL DATA ON THE EFFECTS OF FDI
Foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to “the total value of equity,
long-term debt and short-term debt held by foreign enterprises.”40 More
generally, FDI “involves an entity in one economy (the direct investor)
obtaining a lasting economic interest in another enterprise in a foreign
economy.”41 The Canadian government enacted the ICA with the goal of
attracting FDI into Canada.42 The international consensus, supported by
numerous studies, is that FDI and the resulting existence of multinational
companies within a country’s borders has a positive influence on the host
country’s economy.43 The competition among nations to attract and retain
global enterprises has led to a dramatic surge in global FDI in the past three
decades, and nations continue to adapt their policies to be more FDIfriendly. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development in its 2006 World Investment Report, “there were 205 FDIrelated policy changes across the world in 2005, and most of these changes
made conditions more [favorable] for foreign companies to enter and
operate.”44 Since 1982, global inflows of FDI have soared, increasing from
just C$59.4 billion (approximately US$58.1 billion) to over C$1.3 trillion
(approximately US$1.27 trillion) in 2006.45
38

Wong & Dechert, supra note 36.
See infra Parts III and IV.
40
HOLDEN, supra note 1.
41
Ram C. Acharya & Someshwar Rao, Foreign Direct Investment Trends: A Canadian
Perspective 1 (Industry Canada, Working Paper 2008-13, 2008), available at
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/eas-aes.nsf/eng/ra02066.html (citing the definition of FDI
provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)).
42
See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
43
See, e.g., WALID HEJAZI, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON PUB. POLICY, DISPELLING CANADIAN
MYTHS ABOUT FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 6–10 (2010), available at
http://www.irpp.org/pubs/IRPPstudy/IRPP_Study_no1.pdf (discussing the “many economic
benefits associated with inward FDI,” including advanced technology, increased
productivity, higher-paid jobs, and better management).
44
Someshwar Rao et al., Role of FDI in the Canadian Economy: A Synthesis of
Empirical Research 9 (Industry Canada, Working Paper 2009-04, 2009), available at
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/eas-aes.nsf/eng/ra02088.html (citing U.N. CONFERENCE ON
TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 23 (2006)). Most recently, in the
period from October 1, 2010 to January 15, 2011, at least twenty-seven countries or
economies adopted policies related to foreign investment, and most of these policies focus
on liberalizing and promoting foreign investment. UNITED NATIONS, INVESTMENT POLICY
MONITOR 1 (2011), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20112_en.pdf.
45
Rao et el., supra note 44, at 6.
39
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Studies further indicate that the long-term economic benefits of FDI
outweigh the possible short-term difficulties.46 A 2007 comprehensive
appraisal of available evidence prepared by the Organisation of Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) concludes that FDI brings a net
benefit to host countries:
Based on empirical studies so far it is fair to conclude that inward
direct investment generally help [sic] host countries raise total factor
productivity and, in consequence, their GDP. The main channels
through which this takes effect are, first, direct impacts through (1)
enhanced access to international trade through the link-up with the
investor’s international networks; (2) corporate restructuring and
enhanced governance in the targeted enterprises; and (3) the effect
on host country competition. Most of these impacts are present in
empirical evidence of the effects of M&As on individual companies.
Secondly, important indirect effects (“externalities”) are possible,
chiefly in the form of (4) technology spillovers; and (5) the diffusion
of human capital and knowledge. OECD (2002) [report] not only
found evidence of each of these channels but also concluded that
inward direct investment generally leads to a higher economy-wide
factor productivity and, in consequence, GDP.47

As in other nations, the benefits of FDI have been felt in Canada.
Studies of the impact of FDI on the Canadian economy confirm the
OECD’s conclusions that FDI stimulates economic growth, finding that in
Canada (1) foreign-controlled firms have higher productivity levels48 and
pay higher wages49 than domestic firms; (2) foreign-controlled firms spur
innovation by spending more on research and development than domestic
firms;50 (3) FDI contributes to domestic job growth;51 and (4) FDI increases
capital formation in Canada.52

46

See, e.g., W. Hejazi & P. Pauly, Motivations for FDI and Domestic Capital Formation,
34 J. INT’L. BUS. STUD. 282, 283 (2003); Madanmohan Ghosh & Weimin Wang, Does FDI
Accelerate Economic Growth? The OECD Experience Based on Panel Data Estimates for
the Period 1980–2004, GLOBAL ECON. J., Oct. 2009, at 1. See infra text accompanying notes
53–55 for a discussion of the perceived difficulties related to foreign ownership of domestic
firms.
47
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES
2007: FREEDOM OF INVESTMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD 87 (2007).
48
Id.; Hejazi & Pauly, supra note 46, at 287.
49
HEJAZI, supra note 43.
50
Rao et al., supra note 44, at 6. FDI brings about innovation, not just from foreignowned firms, but also from domestic firms. Studies show that inward FDI complements,
rather than replaces, domestic firm research and development, which dispels fears that
Canada will “free ride” on foreign-owned intelligence and will not strive to build its own
knowledge base and technical expertise. Hejazi, supra note 43, at 27.
51
HEJAZI, supra note 43, at 26.
52
Hejazi & Pauly, supra note 46, at 283; Acharya & Rao, supra note 41, at 11. “Capital
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Despite offering apparent economic benefits, FDI has faced some
criticism. One argument against FDI that has particularly raised concerns
in Canada is that foreign takeovers of Canadian businesses lead to the
“hollowing out” of firms’ head offices located in Canada.53 There is a fear
that foreign takeovers will result in the movement of head offices, and their
accompanying functions (e.g., human resource management, research and
development, high-skill and high-wage positions, financial management),
out of Canada, thereby negatively affecting the Canadian economy.54
Among other things, head offices are found to benefit local economies
through “knowledge transfer and knowledge spillovers” into the general
marketplace.55
Contrary to these concerns, studies find no evidence supporting a
“hollowing out” phenomenon in Canada,56 and employment at head offices
has actually steadily increased from the 1990s through 2005.57 This
increase in head offices has largely been driven by foreign-controlled firms,
which have accounted for six out of ten new head-office jobs created during
the period.58 Furthermore, a survey of senior managers of both foreignowned and Canadian-owned multinational firms in Canada indicates
“foreign-owned subsidiaries operating in Canada have become strategic
leaders in their company’s [sic] global network.”59
In spite of evidence supporting FDI’s positive influence on the
Canadian economy and evidence disputing a “hollowing out” phenomenon,
FDI remains a controversial topic in Canada as fears of too much foreign
ownership continue to fuel debate.60 Public perception and apprehension
about increasing foreign ownership, however, are very different from the
reality of Canada’s domestic marketplace. A comparison of FDI activity in
Canada in relation to the rest of the developed world confirms that such
fears are unfounded and should not drive policy debate on FDI regulation.

formation” refers to the accumulation of capital stock, which is equipment, buildings, and
goods that are invested into the economy instead of consumed. Capital stock is a source of
economic growth. Therefore, a higher rate of capital formation leads to increased growth in
economic productivity and aggregate income. Capital Formation, THE CANADIAN
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params
=A1ARTA0001384 (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
53
HEJAZI, supra note 43, at 9–10.
54
Rao et al., supra note 44, at 12.
55
Id. at 13.
56
HEJAZI, supra note 43, at 8–9.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
GLEN HODGSON, CONFERENCE BD. OF CANADA, IS CORPORATE CANADA BEING
HOLLOWED OUT? IT ALL DEPENDS WHERE YOU ARE 3 (2007), available at
http://www.conferenceboard.ca/documents.aspx?did=1931.
60
HEJAZI, supra note 43, at 1 (discussing and dispelling the “misleading caricature” that
inward FDI is synonymous with excessive foreign control of Canada’s economy).
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Canada has historically been an international leader in inward FDI
(i.e., investment by foreign entities within a country’s borders), and, like the
general global community, experienced an increase in inward FDI from
20% of GDP in 1980 to 31% in 2006.61 However, global FDI trends
suggest “Canada has been losing its attractiveness, relative to other
countries, as a destination for foreign investment.”62 Canada’s share of
global FDI has dropped from 15.7% in 1970 to 3.2% in 2006.63 In 1980,
Canada ranked second behind Ireland in FDI as a percentage of GDP, but as
of 2004, it ranked eleventh among OECD nations.64 Canada’s growth in
foreign investment through mergers and acquisitions, the main source of
FDI in Canada as well as globally,65 lagged behind international levels in
2004 and 2005.66 Furthermore, recent data shows that FDI in Canada
actually fell in 2008.67 Most importantly, the decline in Canada’s share of
global FDI is not simply attributable to the recent increase in FDI in
emerging markets. Rather, as indicated above, 68 Canada has seen its share
of FDI by industrialized countries continually decreasing since 1970.
While the global upward trend in FDI since 1980 is a result of nations
significantly liberalizing their foreign investment policies, FDI still
generally faces more barriers than the international trade in goods.69 A
2006 OECD study of international regulatory regimes on FDI, revised in
2010, evaluated the restrictiveness of such policies among OECD nations.70
The study measures restrictiveness based on “(i) foreign equity restrictions,
(ii) screening and prior approval requirements, (iii) rules for key personnel,
and (iv) other restrictions on the operation of foreign enterprises.”71 Based
on these metrics, Canada was found to be one of the most restrictive nations

61

HOLDEN, supra note 1, at 1; Ghosh & Wang, supra note 46, at 3, 17.
HEJAZI, supra note 43, at 3.
63
HOLDEN, supra note 1, at 1 fig.3 (citing data from the United Nations World
Investment Report); Hejazi, supra note 43, at 14 fig.3 (citing data from the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development).
64
Ghosh & Wang, supra note 46, at 3, 17.
65
HEJAZI, supra note 43, at 6.
66
Achayra & Rao, supra note 41, at 4–5.
67
HEJAZI, supra note 43, at 12–13 (noting that, while still an important indicator that
Canada is not being overrun by foreign investors, the drop in 2008 may have been
attributable to the global financial crisis).
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See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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Achayra & Rao, supra note 41, at 6.
70
Blanka Kalinova et al., OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index: 2010 Update 6 (OECD
Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2010/3, 2010), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/19/45563285.pdf. The OECD has thirty-four member
countries, including Canada, the United States, and major economies of Europe. A list of
OECD member countries can be found at http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351,
en_33873108_33844430_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.
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Kalinova et al., supra note 70, at 9.
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in terms of regimes regulating FDI,72 which is not surprising considering
Canada’s decline in global share of FDI. Among the formal restrictions that
contribute to Canada’s high ranking on the FDI restrictiveness index are:
[R]estrictions on foreign ownership in select sectors; exclusive
domestic ownership applied to select natural resource sectors;
obligatory screening and approval procedures through the Investment
Canada Act; stipulations that foreign investors must demonstrate
economic benefits, increasing the cost of entry and discouraging the
inflow of foreign capital; [and] prior approval of FDI over a certain
threshold.73

These restrictions act as barriers to economically beneficial foreign
investment and contribute to Canada’s position as one of the most
restrictive countries on FDI.
III. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE INVESTMENT CANADA ACT
(ICA)
While the Canadian government continues to assure the world that
Canada is “wide open” to foreign investment, a series of recent applications
of the ICA raise questions about whether Canada’s current Conservative
government, led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper,74 is redefining or
simply reinforcing restrictions on FDI under the ICA review process. First,
in May 2008, the government used the ICA to block a foreign takeover of
MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. (MDA), a Canadian aerospace
company. This marked the first time the Canadian government blocked a
takeover since the ICA was enacted in 1985 (excluding certain instances
related to unique cultural businesses).75 Then, in July 2009, for the first
time in the twenty-four year history of the ICA, the government sued
United States Steel Corporation, a foreign investor, to enforce guarantees
the company had made when it acquired a Canadian business.76 Most
recently, in November 2010, the government decided not to approve the
foreign takeover of the Canadian company Potash Corporation of
Saskatchewan Inc. by the Australian mining company BHP Billiton Ltd.,
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Id. at 17 graph II-1.
Acharya & Rao, supra note 41, at 6–7.
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Prime Minister Stephen Harper took office as leader of the Conservative minority
government in Canada after winning the 2006 election. Phil Hahn, Stephen Harper Wins
Conservative Minority, CTV.CA NEWS (Jan. 23, 2006, 11:06 PM), http://www.ctv.ca/
servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060123/elxn_main_story_060123/20060124?s_nam
e=election2006&no_ads=.
75
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Sue-Anne Fox, Canada v. US Steel: Recent Developments under the Investment
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finding no “net benefit” to Canada in the acquisition.77
The Canadian government emphasizes that these are special, isolated
cases and “should not be construed as a warning of greater intervention in
the marketplace.”78 While that may be true, these cases potentially signify a
shift back to the protectionist attitude that spurred stricter regulation on FDI
in Canada in the 1970s, to the detriment of economic growth.79 Even if the
Canadian government is not taking a tougher stance on FDI, it must be
concerned with the message it has sent to the international community of
foreign investors who may now perceive further obstacles, and
accompanying costs, to potential investment in Canada. At the very least,
the criticism from the international community as a result of these cases
demonstrates the need for Canada to remove much of the subjectivity from
its review process under the ICA and present clearer guidelines for foreign
investors seeking to acquire control within its borders.
A. Canada’s Rejection of the MDA Takeover
On May 9, 2008, then-Minister of Industry80 Jim Prentice “woke up
the toothless tiger from its slumber” and blocked the proposed acquisition
of MDA’s aerospace business by deciding that the purchase was not likely
to bring a “net benefit” to Canada under the ICA’s review process.81 The
decision to block the transaction was the first time the Canadian
government had done so since enacting the ICA in 1985 with the purpose of
encouraging foreign investment. This decision called attention to Canada,
as it was a rare departure from the Canadian government’s normal
reluctance to interfere with market transactions. However, in this case, the
government stepped in to block this acquisition because, in its view, the
transaction presented “national security” concerns warranting its rejection.82
MDA is the leading Canadian information technology and space
products company, well known for its satellite technology Radarsat-2,
which, among other capabilities, monitors Canada’s Arctic.83 Alliant
Techsystems Inc. (ATK), a U.S.-based aerospace and defense company,
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Ian Austen, Canada Blocks BHP’s Purchase of Potash, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/business/global/04potash.html?_r=1.
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Wong & Dechert, supra note 36.
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See supra Part I.
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The Minister of Industry is tasked with carrying out the review process under the ICA.
Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28, §4 (1st Supp.) (Can.).
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Wong & Dechert, supra note 36.
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Bill Mann, Potash Bids Will Test Canada’s Foreign-Takeover Rules, MARKETWATCH
BLOG (Aug. 23, 2010, 12:45 PM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/canada/2010/08/23.
83
Denis Gascon & Jason P.T. McKenzie, Canada Uses Investment Canada Act to Block
Acquisition of MDA by Alliant Techsystems, OGILVY RENAULT LLP (Aug. 18, 2008),
http://m.en.ogilvyrenault.com/mobileweb/content/read/id/76A67C55-CB46-4EE8-9C68E6E04D1C31E5.
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proposed a C$1.325 billion (approximately US$1.296 billion) acquisition of
MDA, specifically seeking to acquire control of the Radarsat technology.84
MDA strongly supported the transaction, finding the sale was necessary to
maintain a thriving space and satellite business,85 and argued to the
Parliament of Canada that government funding on space technology was
insufficient to support a company of MDA’s size.86 MDA further argued
that, through the sale, MDA would have access to the U.S. market,
providing new growth opportunities that were not possible in Canada.87
MDA did not believe it could grow in the U.S. defense industry absent
ownership by a U.S. company.88 For these reasons, MDA’s “shareholders
and management overwhelmingly approved the deal.”89
Despite this approval, then-Minister of Industry Prentice rejected the
deal, siding instead with critics of the transaction who argued the
acquisition “amounted to a handing over of Canadian taxpayer funded
technology to the United States”90 because the Canadian federal
government had provided MDA approximately C$445 million
(approximately US$435 million) in research and development funding to
develop Radarsat-2.91 Nationalist sentiment and protectionist concerns
arose over Canada’s “Arctic sovereignty,” with the government asserting
that the Radarsat technology was vital to defending Canada’s coastline.92
MDA’s Chief Executive Officer, Daniel Friedman, rejected this argument
as a basis for blocking its deal with ATK, stating that the Canadian
government had “all the necessary powers and authority to ensure that in
[the] future it will continue to exercise full control over Radarsat 2.”93
The decision to reject ATK’s bid for MDA was of some surprise,
84
David Ljunggren, Canada Blocks Sale of MDA Satellite Unit to U.S., REUTERS (Apr.
10, 2008, 4:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1038419320080410?pageNumber
=1.
85
Gascon & McKenzie, supra note 83.
86
Ljundggren, supra note 84.
87
Gascon & McKenzie, supra note 83.
88
Wong & Dechert, supra note 36.
89
Gascon & McKenzie, supra note 83.
90
Id.
91
Wong & Dechert, supra note 36.
92
Id. Central to concerns about giving the Radarsat technology to the U.S. was the fear
that Canada would be handing over sensitive data regarding disputes over its Arctic territory.
“Canada remains at odds with the U.S., as well as Russia, Denmark, and Norway, over a
number of issues related to Arctic sovereignty, including a dispute over 1.2 million square
kilometres (460,000 sq. miles) of Arctic seabed estimated to hold up to 25% of the world’s
undiscovered oil and gas reserves.” Gascon & McKenzie, supra note 83. The U.S.
previously rejected Canada’s claims to sovereignty over the Arctic waters, claiming the
waters are international territories. Critics of the MDA transaction also feared that the U.S.
would prevent Alliant from viewing data gathered by its Radarsat satellite, in particular
images of U.S. ships sailing the Arctic waters. Ljunggren, supra note 84.
93
Ljunggren, supra note 84.
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considering the Canadian government had formerly ignored calls to tighten
restrictions on foreign investment and continually declared its hands-off
attitude to market transactions. Prime Minister Harper previously assured
that he “did not want to ‘micromanage’ international investment flows and
pick which transactions to allow.”94 Similarly, then-Minister of Industry
Prentice previously stated, “[T]he Investment Canada Act should not—and
will not—become a shield to protect Canadian industry from the full rigors
of global competition.”95 To address concerns over its apparent change of
course, the government insisted it was not becoming protectionist, and
emphasized that its rejection of the MDA transaction was “a very unique
situation”96 that “should not be construed as a warning of greater
intervention in the marketplace.”97
Nevertheless, the MDA decision, as well as concerns over the
Canadian government’s prior approvals of high-profile foreign acquisitions
of iconic Canadian businesses, led the government to reevaluate its review
process under the ICA.98 The ICA was amended in March 2009 to give the
Minister of Industry power to review proposed acquisitions if there are
“reasonable grounds to believe that an investment by a non-Canadian could
be injurious to [Canada’s] national security.”99 While the amendments
provide procedures for review of “investments that threaten national
security,” they do not actually define what constitutes such an
investment.100 Thus, the ultimate effect of these amendments was to give
the Minister of Industry broader discretion to review and potentially block
foreign acquisitions.
B. Canada v. U.S. Steel
In July 2009, not long after the blocking of the proposed purchase of
MDA, then-Minister of Industry Tony Clement filed a suit in the Federal
Court of Canada requesting a court order compelling United States Steel
Corporation to fulfill commitments it had made to the Canadian
government in order to obtain approval for its acquisition of Stelco Inc.
back in 2007.101 Specifically, Clement was seeking court enforcement of
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Gascon & McKenzie, supra note 83.
99
Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 20 § 25.2(1) (Can.); see also Ackhurst &
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Ackhurst & Beaudry, supra note 37.
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Fox, supra note 76; see also Industry Minister Clement Takes Further Steps to Hold
U.S. Steel to Its Investment Canada Act Commitments, INDUSTRY CANADA (July 17, 2009),
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ic1.nsf/eng/04836.html; Beth Ballog, Canadian Industry
Minister Suing U.S. Steel, PITTSBURGH BUS. TIMES (July 22, 2009, 3:26PM),
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U.S. Steel’s promise to “increase steel production in Canada” and “maintain
employment levels.”102 As a condition for government approval, U.S. Steel
had agreed to maintain employment and steel production above a negotiated
minimum level over a term of three years.103 After acquiring Stelco,
however, U.S. Steel closed most of its Canadian operations and terminated
1,500 Stelco employees.104
In response to the suit, U.S. Steel claimed that its compliance with the
undertakings was not supposed to be measured until the end of an agreed
upon three-year term and, therefore, it was not in breach of its
commitments.105 U.S. Steel further claimed that any breach was due to
circumstances beyond the company’s control, for which investors should
not be held accountable.106 The company’s main contention, however, was
that the enforcement proceedings brought against it under the ICA were in
violation of Canada’s constitutional protection of the right to a fair trial.107
In June 2010, the Federal Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Canadian government instituting proceedings and penalties against foreign
investors as a means of enforcing the ICA.108 Most importantly, in May
2011, the Federal Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision,
confirming the enforceability of a foreign investor’s undertakings under the
ICA.109 This decision is significant because it presents another new
development in the Canadian government’s application of the ICA. Not
only must foreign investors consider whether their proposed acquisition
may be viewed as a “national security” concern (pursuant to the MDA
takeover decision and the resulting ICA Amendments), but they must also
take care in formulating any commitments made to the Canadian
government, as it is now clear that the Minister of Industry will take action
to ensure investors’ compliance. Although “national security” review and
enforcement proceedings under the ICA are exceptions rather than rules, the

http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/stories/2009/07/20/daily33.html.
102
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103
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Id. at 13.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Marl C. Katz, Flash: Court Rejects U.S. Steel Challenge to Investment Canada Act,
DAVIES WARD PHILLIPS & VINEBERG LLP (June 18, 2010), http://www.dwpv.
com/en/17620_24598.aspx. The Canadian government filed an application under section 40
of the ICA to impose a C$10,000 (approximately US$9,800) per day penalty on U.S. Steel
for each day of non-compliance with its promised undertakings. The court rejected U.S.
Steel’s claims that the ICA, specifically section 40, was unconstitutional based on its finding
that the ICA proceedings do not bring about true penal consequences on U.S. Steel and
comport with principles of fundamental fairness. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Canada, [2010] FC 642
(Can.), available at http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2010/2010fc642.html.
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mere potential for such applications creates cause for concern in light of the
high costs foreign investors incur in making acquisition proposals. By
permitting foreign investors to incur post-acquisition penalties, the
Canadian government has armed itself with another means of interfering
with market transactions.
C. Canada’s Recent Rejection of BHP’s Bid for Potash Corp.
The latest significant application of the ICA came in Canada’s review
of BHP Billiton’s $39 billion hostile takeover bid for Saskatchewan-based
Potash Corp., one of the biggest takeover bids of 2010.110 On November 3,
2010, Canada’s then-Minister of Industry Clement announced Canada’s
decision to block BHP’s bid, stating that the company had not demonstrated
that the deal would be of net benefit for Canada.111 Although, pursuant to
the provisions of the ICA, BHP had thirty days from the date of the ruling
to appeal the decision and make further representations to the government,
BHP decided to abandon the deal despite $350 million in costs incurred on
its bid.112
Although Potash’s management did not approve of BHP’s takeover
offer,113 the Canadian government’s rejection of BHP’s bid came as a
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Steven M. Davidoff, As BHP Waits, the Next Steps for Potash, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK BLOG (Sept. 28, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/asbhp-waits-the-next-steps-for-potash/. Potash Corporation is the world’s largest supplier of
potash, the key ingredient in fertilizer.
111
Phred Dvorak & Anupreeta Das, Canada Slaps Down BHP’s Potash Deal, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 3, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703506904575592
870406638644.html.
112
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(Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE6AD2FA20101115.
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Prior to the government’s rejection, Potash had emphatically rejected BHP’s $130 per
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Potash Bid, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2010, 8:12 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/88de240ac5af-11df-ab48-00144feab49a.html#axzz1ZNxSzrpX. Potash had also taken its own steps to
defend against the takeover by filing a securities suit in U.S. district court and adopting a
“poison pill.” Edward Welsch, Potash Corp. Sues to Block BHP Takeover Offer, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 23, 2010, at B3; Steven M. Davidoff, Canadian Takeover Rules Weigh on Potash,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Aug. 17, 2010, 4:18 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2010/08/17/canadian-takeover-rules-weigh-on-potash/. A “poison pill” is a defensive tactic
adopted by a target company’s board of directors to “thwart hostile takeover bids by granting
shareholders the right to purchase shares of their own company or shares of an acquirer at a
deep discount,” thereby making the acquisition more expensive and less attractive to the
bidder. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
487 (3d ed. 2010). Canadian law generally prevents a company’s board from taking
defensive measures, but does allow a company to adopt a short-term poison pill lasting only
sixty days in order for shareholders to make an informed decision on the hostile bid.
Davidoff, supra. Potash had adopted a ninety-day poison pill without any government
intervention, which is thirty days longer than historically allowed by Canadian regulators.
Davidoff, supra note 110. BHP challenged Potash’s poison pill, but the government’s
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surprise to the global market, as many had predicted that Canada would
allow the bid to go through without interference, just as it has done for all
but one of the more than 1,500 reviews undertaken by the government since
adopting the ICA in 1985.114
Prior to the Canadian federal government’s rejection, the
Saskatchewan provincial government, through Premier Brad Wall,
expressed its disapproval of the takeover due to its desire to maintain
Canadian control over Potash, a company with strategic control over an
important natural resource.115 To support its position, Saskatchewan
commissioned an independent evaluation of BHP’s bid by the non-profit
organization Conference Board of Canada, which found that BHP’s bid
would cost the province C$2 billion (approximately US$1.96 billion) in
lower royalty payments over ten years (or 2% of the province’s annual
revenue).116 However, the Conference Board’s overall impression was that
BHP’s proposed takeover was favorable for Saskatchewan, particularly
when compared with a potential competing bid made by China’s Sinochem
Corporation.117 The following is a summary of the Conference Board’s
findings on the risks and opportunities of Potash’s acquisition:
Due to the nature of [Potash Corp.] and the conditions under which it
operates (unlike some other mining takeovers) the risk associated
with acquisition is not related to the potential for [Potash Corp.] to be
“hollowed out” through negative corporate takeover effects (CTEs).
Our assessment of the impact of an acquisition of [Potash Corp.] on
shareholders, governance, senior management, capital, employees,

rejection and BHP’s subsequent scrapping of its bid have made that challenge moot. See
Doug Cameron, Potash Canadian Regulators Won’t Rule on Poison Pill Before Nov. 18,
CAPITAL.GR (Nov. 12, 2010), http://english.capital.gr/News.asp?id=1085970.
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WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2010, at B3, available at http://professional.wsj.com/article/
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115
Curtis Matwychuck-Goodman, Foreign Direct Investment in Canada, PROJECT
GOODMAN (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.projectgoodman.com/2010/12/17/foreign-directinvestment-in-canada-bhp-billiton-and-potash-corporation-of-saskatchewan-%E2%80%93how-exceptions-shape-international-perception-and-why-it-matters-%E2%80%93/.
116
Euan Rocha & Rod Nickel, Report Favors BHP Bid for Potash, Warns on China,
REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2010, 9:04 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/68790/20101005/bhpbid-potash-china.htm.
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[hereinafter CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT], available at http://www.gov.sk.ca/adx/
aspx/adxGetMedia. aspx?mediaId=1245&PN=Shared; Welsch & Dummett, supra note 114.
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but abandoned efforts after the Canadian government’s rejection of BHP’s bid. See Dvorak
& Das, supra note 111.
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corporate donations, and community support is that the impact would
be marginal. In the case of an acquisition, there are some prospects
of positive impact on employment, both in production and head
office jobs.118

The Conference Board’s report found that BHP’s bid had “few
negative takeover effects” and could be beneficial to the province in the
long run, and that an acquisition by a state-owned company like China’s
Sinochem would pose a threat to Saskatchewan’s economy.119
Despite the Conference Board’s recommendations, Saskatchewan
continued to oppose the bid on the basis of the potential lost royalty
payments.120 However, the final decision on whether to approve a takeover
under the ICA does not rest with a provincial government, but rather with
the Canadian federal government.121 The international community thought
that the report would in fact make it easier for the federal government to
find a “net benefit,” since the Conference Board concluded BHP’s
acquisition would be in the province’s best interests.122 Steve Globerman, a
professor commissioned by the Canadian government to prepare a study on
its foreign investment laws, expressed his belief that the government would
approve the deal, stating that “Canadian officials understand ‘selective
protectionism . . . has long-run potential costs that are really antithetical to
Canada’s interests.’”123
Contrary to predictions, then-Minister of Industry Clement announced
that he did not think BHP’s acquisition of Potash would be of net benefit to
Canada.124 The government rejected BHP’s proposal even though BHP had
made commitments to “locate its potash executives in Potash’s home
118

CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 117, at 55.
Id. at i; Phred Dvorak et al., BHP Bid for Potash Gets Modest Boost, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 5, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704631504575531710442
523550.html.
120
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
121
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404576458090678411176.html?KEYWORDS=potash (describing the role of Canada’s
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enshrined in the country’s constitution, over their energy, environmental, mining and landuse policies.”).
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province of Saskatchewan . . . structure the deal so the province doesn’t
take a big revenue hit and set up a committee to make sure it keeps its
promises—all things that Canadian officials had signaled they wanted.”125
Clement publicly stated it was not clear that BHP’s proposed transaction
would benefit Canada, a conclusion based in part on BHP’s lack of
expertise in potash mining and marketing.126 However, the Canadian
government has yet to issue an official explanation of its decision,127 which
it is required to do under the ICA.128
The government’s conclusion raised a red flag in the international
community that Canada was taking a protectionist stance, a position it has
repeatedly lobbied against in diplomatic talks with other nations.129
Responding to criticisms of the government’s interference with the deal,
then-Minister of Industry Clement staunchly defended the decision as “a
perfectly acceptable thing to do,”130 and retorted that “it doesn’t, quite
frankly, lie in the mouth credibly of other nations to criticize Canada for a
single decision about a single situation.”131 Nevertheless, in light of these
criticisms, the Canadian government is again reevaluating the ICA review
process and has promised to issue clearer guidelines for foreign investors.132
The government’s proposal to improve its review process suggests it
recognizes that continued assurances (e.g., declaring that Canada is “wide
open”133 for foreign investment) are no longer sufficient.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT ICA DECISIONS AND THE NEXT
STEPS FOR CANADA
The full impact of the recent decisions under the ICA has yet to be
determined. Like the Canadian government insists, the MDA, U.S. Steel,
and Potash cases may truly represent unique situations—i.e. decisions
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confined to their specific facts creating no serious threat to foreign
investors’ ability to acquire control in Canada in the future. However,
investors and foreign nations cannot ignore the fact that Canada has
recently taken actions under the ICA that represent a departure from the
With these decisions, the current
country’s historical practice.134
Conservative government has made some waves in the international
community and has taken steps to strengthen the Canadian government’s
power to interfere with investment transactions.135
While the three cases signal the Canadian government is not beyond
interfering with the market when it finds it necessary, the Potash deal in
particular raises other important issues that could potentially influence a
foreign investor’s chances of passing the government’s review under the
ICA. First, it can be argued that the Canadian federal government’s
decision to block the Potash deal was, in part, politically motivated. At the
time of the Potash deal review, the Conservative Party in power, led by
Prime Minister Harper, was a minority government, meaning the party was
elected with fewer seats in the national legislature than the combined seats
of all other parties.136 Minority governments enjoy less stability than
majority governments because they must rely on support from the opposing
When
parties in order to pass legislation and stay in power.137
Saskatchewan Premier Brad Wall announced his province’s strong
disapproval of the deal, Prime Minister Harper’s government was
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vulnerable to lose the province’s support if it went against Wall’s wishes.138
Harper’s Conservative Party relied heavily on Saskatchewan’s support, with
thirteen of the fourteen parliamentary seats in Saskatchewan held by the
Conservative Party at the time of the Potash takeover review.139 If Harper
did not respect Saskatchewan’s wishes and allowed the takeover of Potash,
Wall might have campaigned against Harper’s Conservative Party, which
would have left the Conservative Party vulnerable to losing seats in
Saskatchewan during the upcoming 2011 parliamentary election.140 In
addition, Wall garnered support for his position against the Potash takeover
from the other provincial leaders, all of whom represented the opposition
parties in the national legislature.141 While political opposition is not an
unusual basis for a government’s decision, “politics” is not one of the
factors of consideration provided for in the ICA. However, this case
demonstrates that domestic politics can and do play an influential part in the
review process.
The political influence issue leads to another question: How much
power do the provincial governments have in the ICA review process, and
how much power should they have? In the Potash deal, the opinion and
conclusions of one provincial government appeared to hold a considerable
amount of weight, even though the ICA clearly designates decision-making
power to the Canadian federal government. The questions left in the wake
of the blocked Potash deal add further emphasis on the need for clarification
and transparency in the ICA review process.
Although then-Minister of Industry Clement promised in the fall of
2010 to issue a clarification of how the Canadian government applied the
ICA to block the Potash deal, as of September 2011 the government has not
yet done so.142 The Canadian House of Commons’ review of the ICA is
ongoing,143 and it is uncertain whether there will be any major change in the
legislation or Canada’s general policy on FDI.
In the Canadian government’s review, it is important that substantial
empirical data—and not false public perception—drive the government’s
138
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decisions when developing, changing, or evaluating its policies on FDI and
making changes to the ICA review process. Available research finds that
inward FDI brings substantial benefits to a domestic economy, including
enhanced access to international trade networks, improved corporate
governance in targeted enterprises, and increased competition, productivity,
innovation, capital formation, job growth, and, ultimately, increased
GDP.144 Moreover, research finds that these considerable benefits do not
come at the expense of “hollowing out” of Canadian head offices. Rather,
research provides evidence of the exact opposite—that Canada has enjoyed
an increase in head offices and accompanying positive economic influences
as a result of foreign acquisitions.145
Despite the fact that Canada has seen its share of global FDI decrease
over the last decade and the evidence demonstrating the positive impact of
FDI, fears of foreign ownership of Canadian business continue to be a part
of the debate. An important fact often ignored by those who criticize a
liberal stance on foreign investment is that Canada has been a strong player
in the outward FDI market—while foreign ownership in Canada has
increased, Canadian companies are continually acquiring businesses abroad.
Since 1997, Canada has actually experienced a net outflow of FDI, with
Canadian investments in other nations exceeding foreign investment in
Canada.146 Therefore, Canada should be careful not to unduly restrict
foreign investment and suffer retaliation from the global community as a
consequence.147
It is important that the Canadian government emerge from its review
of the country’s foreign investment law with clear guidelines for
enforcement of commitments made under the ICA, like the proceedings
brought against U.S. Steel, and also provide a sincere explanation of its
decision to reject BHP’s bid for Potash. Transparency, and not simply
increased government discretion, must be the focus of changes to the ICA.
Clarifications of the Canadian government’s stance on FDI and its intended
use of the ICA to intervene in acquisitions moving forward are necessary to
regain credibility in the eyes of the global community and show that its
144
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anti-protectionist platform in discussions with global leaders is not just
smoke and mirrors.148 Data plainly indicates Canada has lost some of its
sheen as a destination for foreign investment and is becoming less attractive
relative to its global competition. Considering Canada currently ranks as
the one of the most restrictive countries on FDI and is continuing to lose
ground on more liberal nations like the UK and France,149 the Canadian
government must structure its policies to better compete in the FDI market,
not further restrict FDI because of false public perception or political biases.
The Canadian government was primed for its first major post-Potash
test with an ICA review of the proposed merger between the Toronto and
London Stock Exchanges.150 However, the Canadian government was
never forced to decide whether to approve the deal as it was ultimately
called off because of a lack of support from the companies’ shareholders.151
Although the proposed merger did not involve a natural resource, it again
presented a deal related to a “strategic asset in a strategic industry,”152
which would have shed light on the existence of potential protectionist or
political influences motivating the Canadian government’s decisions under
the ICA. With the demise of the merger, the Canadian government has for
now avoided the international scrutiny that will likely accompany a postPotash ICA decision. If the merger had not been called off and Canada had
decided to block the deal, it would have been much more difficult for Prime
Minister Harper to persuade other nations that Potash was an aberration and
Canada is a free-market promoter, not a protectionist government. The
international community will not know the true impact of the Potash
decision until Harper’s government clarifies the ICA review process as
promised, or another deal involving a “strategic asset” comes under ICA
review. The global business community’s interest in the Toronto–London
merger highlights the need to remove uncertainty and add transparency to
the ICA review process to lend consistency and credibility to Canada as a
global force in the FDI market.
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